SAIF 2026 · SUPPORTING FILES

TAWTHIQ — Tamper-Evident Provenance Chain for Human Decisions over AI

توثيق — سلسلةُ إثباتٍ لقرارِ الإنسانِ على مخرجاتِ الذكاءِ الاصطناعيّ

In one paragraph

A local-first provenance chain that makes AI-assisted decisions forensically verifiable: records are SHA-256 hashed and chain-linked, signed with the owner's hardware-bound key, and time-stamped via OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin). An offline, dependency-free verifier lets any auditor re-check who approved what, and when — without our code and without trusting us.

Scientific poster (PDF) Verification bundle (ZIP, 1.1 MB)

How a record is protected, and what the independent verifier reports under two attacks

Measured results — 27 Sep 2026

Measured by the independent verifier on the live chain at head 3efabf9c… — and then sealed in the chain itself as record #2,128 (tawthiq-20260927T020024817751), signed with the owner's hardware-bound key. The measurement is evidence inside the ledger, not a number on a screen.

2,127	records sealed since 4 June 2026
2,126	record signatures, all valid (2,097 with the hardware-bound key; 29 with a software key)
73	chain seals, all valid (latest 19 Sep 2026; 51 later records await the next seal)
32	OpenTimestamps stamps recorded (2 confirmed in Bitcoin block 965242, checked 4 Sep 2026)
5	broken links, detected and named by the verifier — caused by our own ledger merge (records of 7–9 Sep 2026). Disclosed, not rewritten.

Limits. Single writer, not distributed. Key residency in hardware is asserted by the setup and cannot be proven from the public key alone. Full confirmation of the time stamps requires a Bitcoin node or an independent block explorer.

Tamper tests — 27 Sep 2026

Run on copies of the live bundle with the verifier included here (v2):

Baseline	Live chain as it is: 2,127 records · 2,126 valid signatures · 73 valid seals · 5 disclosed broken links.
Attack 1	One byte changed in record #1000 → caught: link broken at index 1001; the signed content hash no longer matches.
Attack 2	Record #1000 forged and every later seal recomputed (0 broken links) → caught: 1 record signature and 73 of 73 signed chain seals differ from the ledger.

Attack 2 passed the earlier verifier as “sound”. The check that compares every signed hash with the ledger was added the same night; this bundle carries the fixed version.

Verify it yourself (about one minute)

Download and unzip the bundle.
Check the archive's SHA-256:
ce631c5815b0a431bcbf9eb0d45d9fc3f1dc7b0f9a7bcf7d996459e0bb4c4a9f
Run the verifier (Python 3 and ssh-keygen only; no other dependency):

cd TAWTHIQ_verification_bundle_20260927
python3 tahaqquq_mustaqill.py

Expected output (the tool is Arabic-first):

■ الدفتر: 2128 حلقة · الرأس 1efdd32dc08edc52 · كسورُ الربط: 5
■ ختومُ السلسلة: 74 · صحيحُ التوقيع 74 · آخرُها 2026-09-27T02:00:42 على 2128 حلقة
■ تواقيعُ الحلقات: 2127 · صحيح 2127
■ الشاهدُ الزمنيُّ الخارجيّ: 32 ختماً مسجَّلاً

Ledger = 2,128 records (the last one is the sealed measurement above) · Links broken = 5 · Chain seals = 74, valid, the latest covering every record · Record signatures = 2,127, valid · External time stamps = 32. The bundle carries hashes, signatures and public keys only — no document contents and no file names.

Intellectual property

Copyright registration no. 26-12-95029589 — Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (software work).
Trademark application SA-1268915 — under examination.
No patent is claimed.

References

S. Haber and W. S. Stornetta, “How to time-stamp a digital document,” Journal of Cryptology 3(2), 1991.
NIST FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHA-256).
OpenSSH, PROTOCOL.sshsig — ssh-keygen -Y sign / verify.
OpenTimestamps — opentimestamps.org.